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Islancs unto T-kcmselves?
AN EMHPIHICAL STUDY OF LAW FIIM DELI IEVIEW ANID CULTUIE
By Susan Saab Fortney

AM I MY PARTNER'S KEEPER? A 1995 SURVEY OF TEXAS LAW FIRMS
attempted to answer this question by studying law firm peer review and attitudes on peer review, liability, and accountability. The survey instrument
defined "peerreview" as the process in which law firm partners orprincipals
monitor and evaluate the job performance of their colleagues.
Professor Susan Saab Fortney of Texas Tech University School of Law conducted the study, which was partiallyfunded through a grantfrom the Texas
Bar Foundation. This article is an abridgedversion of an articlepublished in
the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, vol. X, p. 271.
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Respondent's Profile
A four-page questionnaire was sent to the managing partner
or principal of firms reporting 10 or more attorneys to the
Texas Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA) program.
Of the 311 questionnaires mailed, 191 were returned, resulting in a response rate of 61 percent.
The survey responses reflect the trend of law firms to limit
principals' vicarious liability by reorganizing as professional
corporations or limited liability firms. Approximately 95 percent of the respondents practice in some form of limited liability firm or corporation. The majority of the respondent
firms (57 percent) operate as professional corporations rather
2
than as limited liability partnerships or companies. Table
One shows firm organization and firm size.

TABLE ONE
Firm Structure and Size
SMALL FIRMS

LARGEFIRMS

MEDIUM FIRMS

MORE THAN 50

26-50

10-25

ATTORNEYS

ATTORNEYS

ATTORNEYS

General partnership

14%

3%

3%

Professional corporation

31%3

72%

580/

Limited liability
partnership

51%

25%

36/

Limited liability
company

3%

0%

3%

This table reveals that even partners in the smallest firms
have attempted to limit partners' vicarious liability by practicing in some form of limited liability firm. Despite these
efforts, firm structure does not guarantee that firm principals
will be shielded from liability.' The judiciary, in the exercise
of its inherent power to regulate the legal profession, may
reject the statutory limits on principals' liability.' Even if the
courts recognize the limited liability shield that virtually
eliminates the vicarious liability of firm principals, the firm's
assets and reputation remain at risk. Therefore, many firms
recognize that partners must take steps to protect their firms
and assets.
Peer Review Measures Employed
Because the majority of the claims against firms relate to
the conduct of firm principals,5 legal malpractice experts recommend that law firms implement peer review to obtain
6
information and evaluate the work of firm principals. Such
peer review takes different forms ranging from traditional
review of productivity and contributions for compensation
purposes to more subjective performance assessment of the
manner in which principals handle client matters.
An increasing number of firms are setting the stage for peer
review by adopting standard procedures and policies applica-

ble to all firm attorneys. For example, firms typically implement policies and procedures relating to conflict checks,
engagement letters, and opinion letters. When firms actually
monitor principals' compliance with established procedures
and policies, firms institute a rudimentary form of peer
review. Compliance with these technical standards can be
determined by reviewing selected client files.
Firm Controls on Principals
Serving as Officers/Directors
The survey reveals that many firms have taken steps to
avoid problem areas identified by legal malpractice insurers
and commentators. For example, legal malpractice experts
recommend that firms prohibit or carefully monitor firm
attorneys acting as officers or directors of for-profit entities.' The majority of respondent firms appreciate the risks
associated with attorney-director service, adopting firm
policies to manage the problem. Sixty-eight percent of the
respondents indicated that their firms require approval or
simply prohibit principals serving as officers or directors of
for-profit entities."6
Evidently, firms are less concerned about exposure for the
activities of not-for-profit entities. Only 33 percent of the
respondent firms monitor principals serving as officers or
directors of not-for-profit entities. Firms may be less concerned about attorneys serving as directors of nonprofit corporations because directors of such corporations have less
exposure than directors of for-profit corporations."
Firm Controls on Principals Serving as Fiduciaries
And Entering Business Transactions with Clients
The results suggest that principals recognize the vulnerability when firm attorneys hold fiduciary positions. Fifty-four
percent of the respondents reported that their firms require
approval or prohibit principals from serving as trustees or
holding some other fiduciary position. A law firm's professional liability policy may cover claims arising out of trustee
activities while specifically excluding claims relating to
directorship activities." This may explain why a smaller percentage of firms monitor attorneys serving in fiduciary positions than the percentage of firms that monitor attorneys'
activities as directors of for-profit corporations.
The majority of the respondents also appreciate the risks
involved when a firm principal accepts stock in lieu of fees.
Approximately 61 percent of respondents noted that their
firms monitor this practice. Nearly as many (50 percent),
monitor firm principals investing in business ventures with
clients. Firms that have not instituted any procedures may
not recognize the malpractice exposure related to firm attorneys entering into business transactions with clients. If such
investments are permitted, the firm and its attorneys are subject to legal malpractice actions alleging conflicts of interests, negligence, and fraud. 3 If the firm is sued, the firm's
legal malpractice policy may not provide coverage since
such policies commonly exclude claims relating to attorneys' business ventures. 4
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Internal Procedures and Efforts to Monitor
Principals' Compliance with Office Procedures
The majority of the respondents do not have procedures to
monitor daily affairs such as withdrawal of client funds. Surprisingly, only 35 percent of respondents require that two
principals sign for withdrawals of client funds.
A series of questions asked whether the respondent firm
conducts periodic reviews to determine principals' compliance
with various office procedures. As illustrated in Table Two, the
responses indicate that firms are more likely to monitor compliance with office procedures relating to firm finances than
procedures relating to client representation matters.

TABLE TWO
Firms that Periodically Review Principals
Compliance with Office Procedures
Billing . .. . . . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . . .. . . . .. 82%
80%
Accepting contingent fee cases ....................
75%
Conflicts of interest ............................
68%
Suing clients .................................
64%
Engagement letters and fee agreements ..............
52%
Screening new litigation .........................
47%
Calendar control ..............................
44%
Client screening ...............................
30%
Non-engagement letters .........................
26%
Responding to sanctions motions ..................
24
%
Seeking sanctions ..............................

Monitoring compliance with conflicts of interest is the
strongest example of a practice that deviates from the pattern
of firms focusing on financial matters rather than client service matters. The national attention focused on conflict of
interest problems probably accounts for these results. Law
firm managers have learned that conflicts of interest can only
be identified if all firm attorneys, including principals, comply with office procedures.
Opinion and Audit Letter Procedures
Managing attorneys of law firms should also appreciate the
importance of firm-wide guidelines and procedures for
issuance of legal opinions. These procedures provide quality
control and reduce the firm's liability exposure for opinion
letters. By taking steps to avoid improvidently rendered opinions, law firms may be able to avoid disciplinary and regulatory actions, as well as civil and criminal liability.5
Although commentators and various bar committees highly recommend internal review procedures, 6 only 20 percent
of the firms require committee approval of all written opinions. A more frequently reported practice (by 35 percent of
the respondents) is that written opinions be approved by two
principals. A larger percentage (59 percent) require a "standard approach" to legal opinion letters.

A significant number of respondent firms exercise additional precautions for audit letters, a strategy encouraged by
organized bar groups over the past 20 years." Seventy-six
percent of the respondent firms require principal approval of
all audit response letters.
Designation of In-House Ethics Counsel
The survey results reflect that Texas firms have participated in the national trend to appoint in-house counsel. 8 The
majority of respondents (73 percent) indicated their firms
have designated a principal or committee to handle ethics or
malpractice problems. Interestingly, only 61 percent of the
respondent firms have a principal or committee assigned to
handle risk management and quality assurance. This indicates
that firms may be more inclined to designate persons to handle ethics problems that arise, than to rely on risk managers
who might be able to take steps to avoid problems.
Vehicles for Obtaining Information on Peers
Approximately half of the respondents reported that their
law firm sections and departments engage in some peer review,
though predominately on an informal basis."9 In response to a
general question regarding peer review programs, 34 percent of
the respondent firms designate a principal or committee to
evaluate the manner in which principals handle client matters.
At the same time only 10 percent employ formal procedures for
reviewing the work of principals, other than review conducted
in connection with compensation decisions. These results indicate that review of principals is largely done on an informal
basis by managing partners or management committees.
According to survey responses, firm principals tend to rely
more on feedback from firm attorneys than from clients.
When asked if firm managers formally seek feedback on principals' performance, 55 percent of the respondents exclusively seek information from other firm principals, while 36 percent obtain information from firm associates. Only 30 percent
solicit information from clients.
As expected, the survey results confirm that as firms grow
they become more bureaucratic, imposing more controls on
the conduct of principals. Of the 34 questions relating to peer
review measures, the responses to 27 questions indicated a
relationship between firm size and the implementation of formal peer review measures. Obviously, principals in smaller
firms can more easily rely on informal mechanisms to evaluate one another.
Conclusion - Reshaping Firm Culture
Although the concept of law firm peer review may appear to
be novel, the study revealed that firms are in fact engaging in
some form of peer review. Most firms periodically monitor
principals' compliance with procedures relating to firm
finances, but devote less vigilance to procedures related to
client services. In certain areas, firms have heeded the warnings
of malpractice experts by implementing controls to deal with
problems such as conflicts of interest and attorneys' service as
members of boards of directors of for-profit corporations.
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Presumably, the percentage of firms with formal procedures should be higher, given that a large percentage of
respondents recognized one or more advantages to peer
review. Respondents, however, perceived countervailing disadvantages and obstacles to peer review. Some obstacles can
be addressed by persons outside the law firm. For example,
state legislators can provide confidentiality to peer review
communications." In an effort to encourage quality control
and risk management, malpractice insurers could allow a premium discount for law firm peer review programs."
Successful implementation of peer review ultimately turns
on attitudes and structures within law firms. The study results
indicate that attorneys who share an institutional perspective
are more likely to implement peer review measures than attorneys who function as a confederation of individual practitioners. Therefore, firms can only overcome resistance to peer
review by "cultivating a collegial atmosphere wherein quality
is revered to the point that partner autonomy becomes secondary to the recognized benefits of quality enhancement."22
When firm principals aspire to build and maintain a team, the
principals must change firm structures that undermine team
culture. For example, firm principals might alter a firm compensation system that gives substantial credit for origination of
legal business. Instead, firms could emphasize collective marketing rather than the individualistic, entrepreneurial "eat what
you kill" approach." In monitoring the manner in which attorneys handle client matters, technical standards review promises to be the type of peer review that will encounter the least
resistance from principals. By adopting standards, firms may
condition principals to accept more intrusive peer review measures by creating an environment of accountability.
In this context, accountability encompasses both individual
and corporate dimensions.24 On the individual level, firm
attorneys must take responsibility for the manner in which
they practice law. Understanding that their acts and omissions
may subject the firm and the other firm members to liability
and possible damage to their reputations, firm members
should be willing to participate in peer review. On both an
individual and corporate level, attorneys and their firms are
accountable to the legal profession for maintaining the highest ethical standards. Finally, law firms and the legal profession must be held accountable for assuring that the system of
self-regulation protects the public. Such accountability may
earn the public trust by demonstrating that firm attorneys are
dedicated to keeping their own houses clean.
1. Following the storm of malpractice suits against major Texas law firms, the
Texas Legislature enacted various statutes to limit professionals' liability. In
1989, the Texas Legislature modified the Texas Professional Corporation
Act to explicitly state that "the corporation (but not the individual shareholders, officers, or directors) shall be jointly and severally liable" with the
tortfeasor. Tex. Rev. Civ. State. Ann. art. 1528e, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
Following banking regulators' malpractice lawsuits alleging failure by principals to supervise their peers, the legislature, in 1991, amended § 5 of the
Texas Professional Corporation Act to state that "shareholders of professional corporations shall have no duty to supervise the manner or means
whereby the officers or employees of the corporation perform their respective duties." Id. In 1991, the Texas Legislature was the first in the nation to
enact a limited liability partnership act. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132b-

3.03 (Vernon Supp. 1996). That year the legislature also adopted a limited
liability company act. Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 1528n (Vernon Supp. 1996).
2. One respondent checked both "Professional Corporation" and "General
Partnership." Assuming that the firm operates as a general partnership of
professional corporations, the firm was included in the PC category. The
percentages in the Large Firm category do not total 100 percent because
of rounding to the nearest whole number.
3. For a discussion of the traps associated with practicing limited liability
partnerships and companies, see Susan Saab Fortney, Seeking Shelter in
the Minefield of UnintendedConsequences - The Traps of Limited Liability Law Firms, Wash. & Lee Law Review, vol. 54, p. 717.
4. See Debra L. Thill, Comment, The InherentPowers Doctrine and Regulation of the Practice of Law: Will Minnesota Attorneys Practicing in
ProfessionalCorporationsor Limited Liability CompaniesBe Deniedthe
Benefit of Statutory Liability Shields? 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1143,
1151 (1994) (referring to the split in the courts as to whether to allow
attorneys to limit their vicarious liability). For example, the court in Stewart v. Coffinan, 748 P.2d. 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) cert. granted,765 P.2d
1277 (Utah 1988), cert. dismissed, Aug. 19, 1988 (unpublished order)
held that a shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional corporation was not vicariously liable for the legal malpractice of another shareholder. Contra First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675
(Ga. 1983) (rejecting the statutory limits on liability "in the interest of
professionalism"). Recently, the Georgia Supreme Court overruled Zagoria "to the extent that it states that this court, rather than the legislative
enabling act, determines the ability of lawyers to insulate themselves
from personal liability for the acts of other shareholders in their professional corporation." Henderson v. HSI FinancialServices, Inc., 471 S.E.
2d 885, 886 (Ga. 1996). This reversal illustrates the uncertainty involved
in predicting whether courts will recognize the new liability shields.
5. According to American Bar Association statistics, attorneys with 10 or
more years of legal experience generate 66 percent of all malpractice
claims. ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers Professional Liability,
The Lawyers' Desk Guide to Legal Malpractice 31 (1992).
6. For example, Robert O'Malley, loss prevention counsel to the Attorneys'
Liability Assurance Society, a captive liability insurer insuring the
nations' largest firms, has stressed the importance of peer review. Larry
Smith, Malpractice Update: Loss Control Not Always a Cure-all, Of
Counsel, Feb. 1, 1993, at 1.
7. As revealed by a 1992 study of 50 law firms nationwide, the majority of
the respondents utilized computerized conflicts systems, required
engagement letters, and second partner review of formal opinion letters.
See Stephen R. Volk et al., Law FirmPolicies and Procedures in an Era
of Increasing Responsibilities: Analysis of a Survey of Law Firms, Bus.
Law., August 1993, at 1567, 1571, 1573, 1581.
8. See Dennis J. Block et al., Lawyers Serving on the Boards of Directorsof
Clients: A Survey of the Problems, Insights, April 1993, at 3, 8 (explaining that professional liability insurers have discouraged the practice of
attorney-directors and have added policy provisions specifically excluding all malpractice claims relating to conduct that occurred when a law
firm member held an executive office with a client corporation).
9. For a thorough discussion of the ethical and liability problems created
when an outside counsel serves in the dual capacity of attorney-director,
see Craig C. Albert, The Lawyer-Director: An Oxymoron? 9 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 413 (1996).
10. The results also show that as firms grow they are more likely to monitor
principals' directorship activities.
11. Some legal malpractice experts believe that attorneys serving on charitable boards face significantly less liability exposure than those serving
on the boards of for-profit entities. See Robert E. O'Malley & Harry H.
Schneider, Danger: Lawyer on Board, 79 A.B.A.J., July 1993, at 102
(attributing heightened liability for service on for-profit corporations to
the threat of shareholder derivative suits). A number of states, including
Texas, have enacted legislation shielding uncompensated directors of
charitable corporations from liability to third person. Daniel L. Kurtz,
Board Liability: Guide for Nonprofit Directors 23, 99 (1988). E.g., Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 84.004 (Vernon 1996) (providing that a
"volunteer who is serving as an officer, director, or trustee of a charitable organization is immune from civil liability for any act or omission
resulting in death, damage, or injury if the volunteer was acting in the
course and scope of his duties or functions as an officer, director, or
trustee within the organization").

12. Volk, supra note 8, at 1571.
13. Dennis Horan and George W. Spellmire, Jr., The Associates' Primer for
Prevention of Legal Malpractice 4 (1987). Because courts will scrutinize
business transactions with clients and presume the transactions to be
fraudulent, unless proven otherwise, "lawyers who start out as investors
in clients' businesses could find themselves winding up as insurers." Jon
Newberry, Perilous Partnerships,A.B.A.J., August 1996, at 106.
14. Jo Ann Felix-Retzke, Practical Guide To Preventing Legal Malpractice 310
(1983) (explaining the scope of the typical business pursuits exclusion).
15. See John P. Freeman, Current Trends in Legal Opinion Liability, 1989
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 235 (1989) (explaining that an opinion could lead
to a number of claims including claims based on negligent malpractice,
negligent misrepresentation, common law fraud, securities law violations, civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting a
breach of duty, actions under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations statute, and penalties under the Internal Revenue Code). In addition to providing some assurance against claims, internal review procedures assist firms in developing uniformity in approaching opinion
matters, educate attorneys on relevant developments, and provide a
source of experienced and knowledgeable attorneys with whom difficult
or novel issues may be discussed. Richard H. Rowe, Law Firm Internal
Opinion Review Procedures,in Opinions in SEC Transactions 1991, at
427 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 725,
1991). Internal peer review procedures for opinion letters may also insulate the attorney handling the transaction against pressure from clients to
give broad opinions and may shield the attorney from unreasonable
demands from attorneys on the other side of the transaction. Arnold S.
Jacobs, Introduction to Securities Law § 11 (1993).
16. E.g., Darrel A. Rice & Marc I. Steinberg, Legal Opinions in Securities
Transactions, 16 J. Corp. L. 375, 440-41.
17. In 1976, the ABA adopted the ABA Statement of Policy Regarding
Lawyers' Responses to Auditors Requests for Information, reprinted at 31
Bus. Law. 1709 (1976). The ABA Statement provides specific guidelines
for attorneys drafting audit responses and recommends a format for audit
responses. Leland C. de la Garza, Auditor's Letter: Understanding and
Responding to an Audit Inquiry Letter, Tex. B.J., January 1994, at 22-23.
18. In response to the explosion of legal malpractice awards, many firms have
appointed firm members to serve as ethics counsel or on ethics committees.
See Daniel B. Kennedy, New Trend is General Counsel in Firms, A.B.A.J.,
January 1995, at 29. Reportedly, the primary motivation behind the
appointment of in-house ethics counsel is the need to establish an attorneyclient privilege with respect to intra-firm communications. For a discussion
of the confidentiality of intra-firm communications, see Gary Taylor,
Counsel to Firms Goes In-House: Legal Costs Are Leading Firms, Like
Their Clients, to Look Insidefor Advice, Nat'l L.J., July 18, 1994, at Al.
19. While only 18 percent of the respondents indicated that the principals
within the same section formally review one another, 51 percent reported that department heads or section leaders monitor the progress of all
matters in their sections. Half of the respondents noted that department
heads or section leaders conduct regular meetings where participants discuss principals' as well as associates' work.
20. Understanding the risks associated with the discoverability of peer
review communications, seven percent of the respondents noted that
their firms do not engage in formal peer review because the results might
be discoverable. Moreover, 36 percent indicated that their firms would
be more likely to institute peer review measures if peer review communications were protected from discovery.
21. According to the survey results, 75 percent of the respondents would institute peer review if legal malpractice insurers provide a premium discount
for peer review. The amount of premium discount that respondents noted
varied from three percent to 30 percent, with an average of 13 percent.
22. John F. Corrigan, PeerReview in the Law Office, in The Quality Pursuit
61, 62 (Robert Greene ed. 1989).
23. For an account of the experience of a large Texas firm which has abandoned the "eat what you kill" philosophy and adopted a more comprehensive scheme that includes production and origination as well as community service, pro bono work, teamwork, and management
contributions, see Amy Boardman, High Risk Strategy Pays Off for
Gardere,Tex. Law., April 10, 1995, at 1, 31.
24. See Paul Y. Ertel & M. Gene Aldridge, Medical Peer Review: Theory
and Practice 386-87 (1977) (analyzing the different aspects of public and
professional accountability within the context of medical peer review).

